Mira Kyivska

UK audit watchdog reviews governance rules for private equity-owned firms

UK audit watchdog reviews governance rules for private equity-owned firms
Audit oversight under review

Growing private equity investment in the UK accounting sector is prompting closer scrutiny of how audit firms are governed. The Financial Reporting Council is reviewing its audit firm governance code as firms seek external capital for acquisitions and AI investment, raising questions about oversight, independence and conflicts of interest.

Highlights

  • Financial Reporting Council is reviewing its audit firm governance code due to shifts toward private equity and public ownership models among UK firms.
  • Concerns center on whether dual governance layers in externally owned audit firms create risks of weakened oversight, independence, or duplication of controls.
  • Grant Thornton is majority-owned by Cinven since 2024, with MHA listed on Aim and RSM considering flotation, prompting FRC to assess public interest safeguards post-ownership changes.

Governance review targets changing ownership structures

As reported by the Financial Times, the Financial Reporting Council is examining whether its governance framework for the UK’s largest audit firms remains fit for purpose as ownership models shift beyond the traditional partnership structure.

The regulator is reviewing the audit firm governance code, which Anthony Barrett, the FRC’s head of supervision, says was designed for a different period and a different model of firm ownership. Barrett says the FRC needs to update its code and guidance as the sector develops, although the review is not limited only to changes linked to new ownership structures.

Several accounting firms have sold stakes to private equity investors or tapped public markets in recent years. Grant Thornton has been majority owned by Cinven since 2024, while mid-tier firm MHA listed on London’s Aim market last year. RSM, the world’s seventh-largest accountancy firm, is also considering a potential flotation as it looks for capital to compete with rivals backed by buyout groups.

The code includes requirements for independent non-executive directors to hold leadership to account and to ensure audit quality and the public interest are reflected in decision-making. The FRC is now asking whether externally owned firms, including those controlled by private equity groups or listed on stock exchanges, have governance arrangements that still deliver those objectives.

Oversight concerns extend to market and public interest risks

One area under scrutiny is the emergence of two layers of governance in some externally owned audit firms, where a parent entity sits above a separately governed audit business. Industry figures say this can leave the leaders of the audit entity with limited influence over decisions taken at the parent level.

The FRC is asking firms whether separate group-level and audit governance structures create a risk of problems falling between the cracks, or whether they lead instead to burdensome duplication. Barrett says the regulator is focused on understanding how these relationships work in practice and whether they are capable of delivering the code’s objectives.

The review comes as regulators in several markets examine whether external capital could weaken auditor independence or create conflicts of interest. Iosco is assessing the implications for independence, audit quality and conflicts, while the Dutch financial regulator says the risks of private equity investment in audit firms outweigh the opportunities.

In the UK, the FRC has previously said it is not opposed to alternative capital structures for audit firms. But it is also testing whether the duty to protect the public interest remains properly safeguarded after ownership changes, and whether audit businesses continue to receive the same level of scrutiny under new corporate structures.

In our earlier article, we examined the UK debate over how to remake the state, focusing on whether further centralising power in Number 10 speeds up delivery or instead weakens execution. We highlighted the argument that clearer delegation, stronger cabinet government and devolution could achieve structural change more effectively than concentrating authority at the centre.

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