Golden parachute: How leaders of major crypto companies protect themselves from market downturn

Traders Union
All News
Editors' Picks
The anatomy of anti-crisis contracts

What makes executives untouchable

Long before this year’s collapse in the stock prices of crypto companies, executives had already protected themselves through payouts detailed in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings.

With generous compensation packages that continued to pay out even during a brutal bear market, the fine print tells a very different story from their public statements.

A vivid example is Michael Saylor and his company Strategy. The company’s stock fell by more than 60%, yet his personal financial position remained unchanged. A special class of super-voting shares (Class B), a founder-friendly board of directors, and generous equity awards ensure his stability regardless of what happens to the company. While bitcoin falls, Saylor remains within his own financial ecosystem, protected both legally and structurally.

In July 2025, Strategy reached a peak market capitalization of $124.7 billion, which later fell to $49 billion. Overall, the stock lost 61% in 12 months. Yet Saylor’s personal wealth — estimated at over $5 billion — was barely affected.

The art of the soft landing by Anthony Pompliano

A similar approach was used by Anthony Pompliano during the SPAC deal for ProCap, which provided the company’s leadership with a $400 million compensation package. At first, the market was thrilled: shares of the SPAC Columbus Circle Capital Corp. I, which was supposed to take ProCap public, briefly jumped above $16 in June — driven purely by optimism about Pompliano’s media influence.

But when the price returned to the pre-announcement level of $10, Paul Glazer acquired 7.7% of the company and publicly opposed the deal, calling it unacceptable. The reason was obvious: Pompliano structured his compensation so that he would receive no less than $50 million personally, even if the stock price dropped by half — from $10 to $5. Moreover, the contract granted him an additional $10 million cash payout in the event of early termination without cause.

Loading...

The tweet was deleted by the author.

But we saved everything 🙂.

David Bailey and Nakamoto

Nakamoto is one of the brightest examples of how corporate architecture can separate a CEO from market reality. Under David Bailey’s leadership, NAKA shares fell 98.7% — from a maximum of $34.77 to less than $0.45. For investors, this is practically a total loss. However, SEC documents — specifically Exhibit 10.15 to Form 8-K — tell a different story.

Bailey received a $250,000 signing bonus, $58,333 in monthly payments, a grant of 5 million NAKA options, $1 million in RSUs, and eligibility for $2.1 million in annual bonuses — all while using the company’s private jet. In other words, while the stock evaporated to pennies, his contract functioned like an unshakable Swiss watch.

Loading...

The tweet was deleted by the author.

But we saved everything 🙂.

“We’re all gonna make it”

The problem is not limited to a few well-known companies. When DeFi Development Corporation promised CEO Joseph Onorati an annual salary of $574,000 and the possibility of receiving bonuses of up to 200%, the company’s stock was already falling — and later dropped another 48%.

At Core Scientific, CEO Adam Sullivan increased his compensation to $41.9 million in 2024 — 47 times more than the year before. And all of this happened against the backdrop of complete stock stagnation in 2025.

Upexi, which accumulates Solana reserves, pays CEO Allan Marshall a salary of $840,000, grants 75,000 RSUs every six months, and issues 500,000 warrants with a strike price of $2.28. The paradox is that the market values the company lower than the worth of its own SOL holdings — yet this has no effect on his compensation.

Shareholder revolt

After a series of such incidents, shareholders of several crypto companies — especially bitcoin miners — began actively voting against executive compensation packages. The level of opposition reached 36%, which is 29% higher than the average in the S&P 500. This is the first real signal that investors have grown tired of funding a “protected class” that bears almost no personal risk.

Will this system change?

The crypto industry was built on the idea of transparency and a new financial ethic — but in reality, its corporate mechanisms are sometimes even harsher than those of traditional finance. Executives have created a system that allows them to avoid becoming the ones who go bankrupt, while investors are the first to pay for market mistakes.

And the key question remains: can the industry that once set out to reinvent finance restructure its own rules so that stock declines are felt not only by shareholders, but also by the executives who run crypto companies?

This material may contain third-party opinions, none of the data and information on this webpage constitutes investment advice according to our Disclaimer. While we adhere to strict Editorial Integrity, this post may contain references to products from our partners.