U.S. Treasury moves to block A7 Network over Russia-Iran sanctions evasion
Washington is escalating its campaign against cross-border sanctions evasion by targeting the A7 Network, a shadow banking system tied to Russia and used by Iran to move illicit funds. The action combines a proposed FinCEN funding ban, a new financial-sector alert, and OFAC sanctions that expand pressure on entities linked to the network’s global sub-agents.
Highlights
- Treasury and OFAC sanction A7 Network, designating it a significant transnational criminal organization and blocking U.S. property to disrupt Russia-Iran sanctions evasion.
- FinCEN proposes blocking A7 sub-agents, citing their processing of over 7.5 trillion rubles (about $91.5 billion, 13% of Russia's 2025 foreign trade) and facilitating $17 billion globally between January 2025 and June 2026.
- Treasury links A7 Network to Iran’s IRGC, Iranian oil entities, North Korean crypto theft, and notes expanded compliance risks as restrictions apply to entities with 50%-plus blocked ownership.
Treasury action targets A7 payment channels
As reported by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the measures are part of Operation Economic Outcast and are aimed at disrupting the A7 Network’s role in sanctions evasion, money laundering and illicit cross-border payments. FinCEN is proposing a rule that would prohibit transmittals of funds involving the network’s sub-agents, while OFAC is sanctioning the A7 Network as a significant transnational criminal organization.Treasury says the network was created and backed by U.S.-sanctioned persons and has built a web of third-country companies designed to disguise restricted payments as ordinary trade activity. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent says the action is intended to cut off financial infrastructure used by Iran and other U.S. adversaries to evade sanctions and access the international financial system.
In its notice of proposed rulemaking, FinCEN describes the sub-agents as a core operating layer in a parallel payment system linked to Russian illicit finance and exploited by Iranian actors and other threat groups. Treasury says the network claims that as of January 2026 it processes more than 2,000 transactions a day with a total volume above 7.5 trillion rubles, equivalent to about $91.5 billion and roughly 13 percent of the Russian Federation's 2025 foreign trade transactions.
FinCEN says its investigation identifies more than $17 billion in transactions processed globally by A7 sub-agents between January 2025 and June 2026. The agency also issued an alert for financial institutions with red flags intended to help detect and report suspicious activity tied to the network, and the public comment period on the proposed rule closes 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.
Sanctions expand risks for banks and counterparties
Treasury says the A7 Network has been used by actors including Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, entities tied to Iranian oil sales, and procurement channels linked to weapons-related activity. It cites one sub-agent that received nearly $140 million from entities involved in Iranian sanctions evasion, and another that transferred about $1.6 million to a company linked to Iranian sanctions evasion and weapons procurement efforts.OFAC says the network is led by Ilan Mironovich Shor and includes sub-agents whose websites and bank accounts are controlled by A7 staff using custom-built virtual private networks to mask their location and execute payments rapidly. Treasury also links the network to Nobitex, Iran’s largest digital asset exchange, and says it has facilitated transactions related to North Korean cryptocurrency theft activity and other illicit actors.
As a result of the designation, all property and interests in property of the A7 Network that are in the United States or under the control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. Treasury says the restrictions also extend to entities owned 50 percent or more by blocked persons, raising compliance risks for financial institutions and non-U.S. counterparties involved in transactions that touch the network.
Our earlier article on the International Criminal Court changing its health insurance arrangements detailed how the ICC and AXA agreed to end their contract amid concerns about exposure to the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions. We noted that the ICC moved to an unnamed new insurer to reduce operational disruption risk, highlighting how sanctions compliance pressures can reach routine contracts and services.